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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
McKEE, Circuit Judge. 
 
Jay C. Smith, the former principal of Upper Merion High 
School in Upper Merion, Pennsylvania, appeals from a jury 
verdict in favor of defendants in the civil rights suit he filed 
under 42 U.S.C. S 1983. The suit arose from an infamous 
murder and prosecution that were the subjects of books by 
noted author, Joseph Wambaugh, as well as Smith's 
criminal defense attorney. The prosecution also generated a 
host of criminal and civil litigation. See Smith v. Holtz, 30 
F. Supp.2d 468, 471 (E. D. Pa. 1998)(collecting cases). 
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In 1986, Smith received three death sentences following 
conviction for the murder of Susan Reinert and her two 
children. Reinert had been an English teacher at Upper 
Merion High School while Smith had been the principal. 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court subsequently vacated 
Smith's murder convictions, and remanded for a new trial 
because prejudicial hearsay had been improperly admitted 
during his trial. However, before Smith could be retried, he 
learned that the prosecution had not disclosed certain 
evidence that Smith claimed was exculpatory. The trial 
court found prosecutorial misconduct, but refused to bar 
retrial. However, on appeal of that decision, the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the double jeopardy 
clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution prohibited retrial, 
and ordered Smith's release. 
 
Thereafter, Smith filed the instant civil rights action. He 
alleged that the defendants' deliberate suppression of 
exculpatory evidence violated the holding of Brady v. 
Maryland, 373 U. S. 83 (1963), and that he was therefore 
entitled to compensation for the resulting denial of his 
constitutional right to due process of law. The jury returned 
a verdict in favor of all of the defendants, and the District 
Court denied Smith's post-trial motions. Smith v. Holtz, 30 
F. Supp.2d 468 (E. D. Pa. 1998). This appeal followed. We 
will affirm. 
 
I. BACKGROUND1 
 
The events leading to Smith's criminal prosecution began 
to unfold on Monday, June 25, 1979, at about 5:20 a. m., 
when a police officer found Susan Reinert's nude body in 
the hatchback trunk of her car. "The body showed evidence 
that Ms. Reinert had been chained and beaten, and her 
nude body was left lying in the fetal position in the back of 
her car. . . ." Id. at 471. At the time of her death, Reinert 
taught English at Upper Merion High School. 
 
A forensic pathologist examined Reinert's body and 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Our recitation of the facts is taken from the reported opinions of the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, the Pennsylvania Superior Court and the 
United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. 
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"determined that Ms. Reinert had sustained massive 
hemorrhaging in the eye area and abrasions over her body. 
He also opined that certain prominent bruises on the back 
of the body . . . were consistent with the imprint of a chain. 
The cause of death was determined to be asphyxiation from 
an overdose of morphine, which was consistent with having 
been caused by criminal agency." Commonwealth v. Smith, 
568 A.2d 577, 583 (Pa. 1989). The pathologist opined that 
Reinert's death probably occurred during the morning 
hours of Sunday, June 24, 1979. Id. 
 
Mary Grove, Reinert's next door neighbor, and Ms. 
Grove's granddaughter, Beth Ann Brook, saw Reinert and 
her two young children, Michael (age 10), and Karen (age 
11) on Friday, June 22, 1979, at about 9:20 p. m., on 
Reinert's front porch. Shortly thereafter, Ms. Grove and 
Beth Ann heard Reinert and her children drive away in 
Reinert's car. Beth Ann noticed that Karen was wearing a 
small green pin with a white "P". This was the last known 
time that anyone saw Michael or Karen Reinert. Id. at 548. 
 
Following the discovery of Susan Reinert's body, the local 
and state police conducted an extensive search in an effort 
to locate Michael and Karen. Karen and Michael had close 
relationships with their father -- who was divorced from 
their mother -- and their paternal grandmother. Both 
children knew where their father and paternal grandmother 
lived, and both children knew how to reach them by 
telephone. Id. at 587. However, neither the father nor the 
paternal grandmother ever heard from the children after 
June 22, 1979. 
 
In addition to the search by local and state police, the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation opened a "missing persons 
case" and assigned eighteen agents full-time to a 
nationwide search that lasted five months. However, neither 
the FBI nor the state or local police ever found a trace of 
either of the two missing children. Id. at 587. 
 
Soon after Reinert's body was discovered, suspicion 
focused on William Bradfield (who was also an English 
teacher at Upper Merion High School), and on Smith. Police 
were eventually able to build a case against Bradfield, and 
he was charged with the murders of Reinert and her two 
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children. In 1983, a jury convicted him of those murders, 
and he was thereafter sentenced to three consecutive life 
sentences. See Commonwealth v. Bradfield, 508 A.2d 568 
(Pa. Super. 1986). Bradfield died in prison in 1998 without 
ever disclosing the location of the bodies of the Reinert 
children. 
 
In 1986, three years after Bradfield's trial, Smith was 
arrested and also charged with the Reinert murders based 
upon evidence that he had conspired with Bradfield.2 
During the ensuing trial, the Commonwealth introduced 
evidence that Bradfield had been involved in a romantic 
relationship with Reinert from 1973 until the time of her 
death. Reinert had made Bradfield the primary beneficiary 
under her will, the sole beneficiary of her $730,000 in life 
insurance, and the guardian of her children in the event of 
her death. She did all this because she believed Bradfield's 
promise that he would marry her. However, unbeknownst 
to Reinert, Bradfield had a lover named Susan Myers. 
Bradfield told his friends and Myers that he was not 
interested in Reinert even though Reinert was enamored 
with him. Commonwealth v. Smith, 568 A.2d at 604. 
 
As noted above, Smith was the principal of the high 
school where both Reinert and Bradfield taught. Smith's 
relationship with Reinert appeared to be strictly 
professional, but his relationship with Bradfield was quite 
nefarious. The Commonwealth's theory during Smith's 
prosecution was that Smith and Bradfield conspired to kill 
Reinert so they could share in her life insurance proceeds, 
and the testamentary assets that would go to Bradfield 
upon Reinert's death. The Commonwealth believed that 
Bradfield and Smith abducted Reinert and her two children 
pursuant to that conspiracy, and that Smith then killed 
them somewhere in Pennsylvania. Smith v. Holtz , 30 F. 
Supp.2d at 473. 
 
According to the Commonwealth, the illicit relationship 
between Smith and Bradfield began shortly after Smith's 
arrest on charges of theft. Smith had been charged with 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. At the time of his arrest, Smith was in prison for convictions for 
theft 
by deception, receiving stolen property, possession of a firearm without 
a license and possession of marijuana. Attorney General's Br. at 8. 
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theft from a Sears in St. David's Mall in Montgomery 
County, Pennsylvania, in August of 1977, and Bradfield 
had been Smith's alibi witness at Smith's theft trial. 
Commonwealth v. Smith, 568 A.2d at 604. The 
Commonwealth theorized that Bradfield's alibi testimony 
had been perjured, and that Smith's motives for killing 
Reinert included preventing her from disclosing that his 
defense had consisted of perjured testimony.3 
 
During Smith's murder trial, the Commonwealth 
contended that Smith and Bradfield formed their 
conspiracy to kill Reinhert and her children sometime after 
the theft trial. Although Bradfield's testimony had 
established Smith's alibi, the Commonwealth introduced 
testimony during Smith's murder trial that established 
that, contrary to Bradfield's alibi testimony, Smith had 
actually been inside the Sears store when the theft 
occurred. Id. That evidence was introduced at Smith's 
murder trial to demonstrate the nature of the relationship 
between Bradfield and Smith. 
 
The Commonwealth also introduced physical evidence 
that linked Smith to the Reinert murders. A green pin with 
a white "P", similar to the one that Beth Ann Brook saw 
Karen Reinert wearing on June 22, 1979, was recovered 
from under the front seat of Smith's car. A hair similar to 
Susan Reinert's was found inside Smith's home, and 
testimony was offered to establish that fibers found on 
Reinert's body were similar to fibers from a carpet in the 
basement of Smith's home. In addition, Smith's former 
military reserve unit was named 79 USARCOM, and a comb 
imprinted with "79 USARCOM" was found in Reinert's car 
under her body. The prosecution also introduced a bag of 
identical combs that had been recovered from Smith's 
home. Finally, the prosecution introduced a letter that 
Smith had written to his wife while he had been 
incarcerated on the theft charges. In that letter, Smith 
asked her to dispose of the carpet in their home (the one 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. It is not clear why Smith would be that concerned with Bradfield's 
perjury being disclosed. Inasmuch as the jury convicted Smith despite 
Bradfield's alibi testimony, the jury clearly rejected that testimony, and 
Smith's alibi defense. 
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with fibers similar to fibers found on Reinert's body), and 
clean the interior of his car (where Karen Reinert's pin was 
later found). Id. 
 
The Commonwealth also presented the testimony of two 
inmates who had been incarcerated with Smith. One 
inmate testified that Smith asked him to kill state police 
detectives investigating the Reinert murders. The other 
testified that Smith had confessed his complicity in the 
Reinert murders to him, and that Smith had admitted to 
killing Reinert both for money and because he was afraid 
she would reveal that Bradfield had offered perjured alibi 
testimony. Id. at 605. 
 
Bradfield was not called as a witness during Smith's 
murder trial. Nonetheless, the Commonwealth was allowed 
to present the testimony of several people who were either 
Bradfield's close friends or lovers. The first of these 
witnesses was Vincent Valaitis, another English teacher at 
Upper Merion High School. Valaitis testified that Bradfield 
told him in the fall of 1978 that he (Bradfield) had 
volunteered to serve as an alibi witness at Smith's theft 
trial. Valaitis also testified about several conversations he 
had with Bradfield in which Bradfield made statements 
incriminating Smith and suggesting that Smith was a Mafia 
hitman. Id. at 606. Valaitis said that Bradfield had urged 
him to join Bradfield, Susan Myers, and another teacher, 
Chris Pappas, on a trip to the seashore resort of Cape May, 
New Jersey, on the weekend that Reinert was killed. 
Valaitis claimed that Bradfield told the group that Smith 
was going to kill Reinert during that weekend and that their 
presence with Bradfield in Cape May would give him an 
alibi. Id. Chris Pappas was allowed to testify that Bradfield 
said that Smith had gone through with his threats and 
killed Reinert after he learned of Reinert's death. Id. 
 
Other witnesses, including Susan Myers, also testified 
about conversations they had with Bradfield in which 
Bradfield described Smith's murderous intentions. Still 
other witnesses were allowed to testify about other out-of- 
court statements Bradfield had made, including statements 
that Smith was mentally unstable, that Smith intended to 
kill several persons including Reinert, and that Smith 
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wanted to kill anyone remotely connected with the Reinert 
investigation. 
 
Smith did not testify in his own defense. However, he 
attempted to construct a defense around the theory that 
Bradfield had killed Reinert at the beach in Cape May, New 
Jersey, where Bradfield, Myers and Pappas were when the 
murders occurred. 
 
Smith's instant civil rights suit arises from the testimony 
of Corporal John Balshy, a Pennsylvania State Trooper who 
testified for the Commonwealth. Corporal Balshy was one of 
the investigators assigned to the Reinert investigation, and 
he had been present during Reinert's autopsy. He testified 
that before the autopsy began, he examined Reinert's body 
for physical evidence, and found the red fibers that were 
subsequently linked to the carpet in Smith's home. He also 
testified that he noticed what he termed a "sparkle" on the 
feet of Susan Reinert, and that he used rubber "lifters" to 
collect the material from her feet. Smith v. Holtz, 30 F. 
Supp.2d at 472.4 He used a total of five lifters to collect 
material. He testified that two lifters each contained one 
grain of this "sparkle" material, and that the material was 
lifted from Reinert's left foot and left heel.5 Balshy said that 
he thought that the material lifted from Reinert's feet was 
dust or lint that was of no evidentiary value, but he 
conceded that it "could have been sand."6 Id. at 473. Balshy 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The lifter is a flat piece of rubber with adhesive on one side. When 
used, a clear piece of cellophane is removed to expose the adhesive 
surface. The lifters are so named because they usually are used to "lift" 
fingerprints from a crime scene. Smith v. Holtz, 30 F. Supp. at 472. 
 
5. The precise location of this material is not clear. During Smith's 
murder trial Balshy "testified on cross-examination that he had used the 
. . . lifters to remove granular particles which looked like sand from 
between the victim's toes." Commonwealth v. Smith, 615 A.2d at 182. 
However, testimony during the trial on the instant civil rights complaint 
caused the District Court to conclude, "[n]o[particles] were found on the 
lifters used between the toes of Susan Reinert." Smith v. Holtz, 30 
F.Supp 2d at 478. 
 
6. This testimony was given on cross-examination. During the trial of 
Smith's S 1983 claims, William C. Costopoulos, Smith's criminal defense 
counsel, testified that he had known beforehand that Balshy would 
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gave the lifters to State Trooper Ronald F. Coyler, who was 
collecting evidence during the investigation. Id. The 
existence of sand on Ms. Reinert's feet supported Smith's 
theory that Reinert was killed at the seashore. However, the 
Commonwealth did not disclose the existence of the lifters 
to Smith or his trial counsel and they were never 
introduced into evidence. 
 
The District Court concluded that the prosecutor, 
Richard Guida of the Office of the Attorney General of 
Pennsylvania, did not know of the lifters during the trial. 30 
F. Supp.2d at 473. However, the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court concluded otherwise. That Court concluded that 
Guida knew of them during the trial, and that he realized 
their importance to the defense (though it is still not clear 
exactly when the Court believed he first learned of them). 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated: 
 
       The adhesive "lifters" used to remove and retain the 
       sand from between the victim's toes were discovered by 
       the Commonwealth during appellant's trial but were 
       not disclosed to appellant despite the prosecutor's 
       awareness of their importance. This is established by a 
       mid-trial memorandum from the assistant attorney 
       general who prosecuted appellant to his superior, the 
       executive deputy attorney general stating: "It is obvious 
       from [defense counsel's] tactics thus far that he will 
       attempt to establish that Mrs. Reinert was killed at the 
       shore in Cape May, New Jersey by William Bradfield, 
       Chris Pappas, and Susan Myers. The sand, therefore, 
       is extremely material to the defense case." 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
testify about finding something that could have been sand on Reinert's 
feet. Balshy retired from the state police in 1981 and began working as 
a private investigator. Apparently, Balshy provided investigative services 
to a member of Costopoulos' firm before Costopoulos was appointed to 
represent Smith as defense counsel. It was as a result of Balshy's work 
for Costopoulos' firm that Costopoulos learned about the lifters and 
learned of Balshy's observations. However, despite that knowledge, 
Costopoulos did not ask the Commonwealth to produce the lifters. App. 
520a-522a. 
 
We take no position on whether defense counsel's failure to demand 
the lifters precludes Smith's S 1983 claim. 
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Commonwealth v. Smith, 615 A.2d 321, 323 (Pa. 1992) 
(emphasis added). However, regardless of when Guidafirst 
learned about the lifters, it is clear that Guida honed in on 
Balshy's testimony about lifters and attacked Balshy's 
credibility during Smith's murder trial despite the damning 
nature of so much other physical and circumstantial 
evidence establishing Smith's guilt. Guida went so far as to 
imply that Balshy had fabricated testimony and planted the 
lifters and particles after the autopsy. Id. Guida also 
presented the testimony of other State Troopers who were 
present at Reinert's autopsy who remembered nothing 
about sand or lifters. During his summation, Guida even 
argued that Smith had paid Trooper Balshy to concoct his 
testimony.7 Id. 
 
After the Commonwealth rested its case, State Trooper 
Victor Dove was assigned the duty of gathering up 
evidence. 30 F.Supp.2d at 473. On April 24, 1986, while 
gathering the evidence, he found the lifters in an evidence 
locker at the barracks of the state police. 615 A.2d at 323. 
According to the District Court, Dove waited one week, until 
May 1, 1986, the day after Smith's trial ended, before he 
told John Holtz -- the chief State Police investigator 
assigned to the case -- of the discovery. 30 F. Supp.2d at 
473. Holtz immediately contacted Guida, who told Holtz to 
bring him the lifters the next day. Holtz did so, but Guida 
still did not disclose their existence to Smith's counsel. 
Rather, the lifters were turned over to the State Police 
Bureau of Professional Responsibility which, at Guida's 
recommendation, was conducting an investigation into 
Balshy's possible perjury. Id. That investigation was being 
conducted by Paul Yatron, Executive Director of the 
Attorney General's Office, and by Special Agent John 
Purcell, also of the Attorney General's Office. However, 
Yatron also failed to disclose the existence of the lifters to 
Smith's counsel. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Guida also recommended to the Deputy Executive Attorney General 
that Balshy be investigated for possible perjury charges. 615 A.2d at 
323. However, investigations conducted after the trial by the state police 
and the Office of the Attorney General concluded that there was no 
evidence of perjury or falsification of evidence by Balshy. Id. at 324. 
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Smith was convicted of the first-degree murders of 
Reinert and her children on April 30, 1986. However, just 
before sentencing, he filed a motion for a new trial based on 
after discovered evidence. He alleged that the prosecution 
allowed Raymond Martray (one of the inmates who testified 
for the Commonwealth) to testify without disclosing that 
Martray had open criminal charges, and expected leniency 
in return for testifying against Smith. 
 
       Specifically, [Smith] learned that the Commonwealth's 
       chief witness [Martray], who denied the existence of 
       any bargain in exchange for his testimony against 
       [Smith], was in fact awaiting sentencing for unrelated 
       crimes and did in fact receive favorable treatment by 
       the Commonwealth at his sentencing. [Smith] was 
       thereby precluded from impeaching Mr. Martray's 
       veracity by exposing his motivation to testify falsely 
       against appellant in order to minimize his own 
       punishment. 
 
615 A.2d at 323. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial 
court concluded that the prosecution's misconduct did not 
warrant a new trial and it denied Smith's motion. Id. 
Thereafter, Smith was sentenced in accordance with the 
jury's earlier verdicts. 
 
Smith's death sentences were subject to automatic review 
by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court;8 and on appeal, Smith 
raised nineteen claims of error that he argued required a 
new trial. These included challenges to the sufficiency of 
the evidence, the admission of numerous hearsay 
statements, and the Commonwealth's failure to disclose 
Martray's pending criminal prosecution. 568 A.2d at 605- 
606. 
 
By the time Smith's appeal was decided, Guida had 
resigned from the Attorney General's Office and another 
Assistant Attorney General, Robert Graci, had been 
assigned to represent the Commonwealth during the appeal 
process. In July of 1988, Graci first learned that the lifters 
existed. He immediately recognized their implication and 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. See S 9711(h) of the Pennsylvania Sentencing Code, 42 PA. CONST. ST. 
ANN. S 9711(h). 
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importance, and concluded that the lifters had to be 
disclosed to Smith's counsel. Executive Director Yatron did 
not agree that the lifters had to be disclosed, but he did not 
attempt to dissuade Graci from doing so. Accordingly, on 
July 12, 1988 -- more than two years after Smith's 
convictions for the Reinert murders -- the Commonwealth 
officially informed Smith's counsel of the existence of the 
lifters. 615 A.2d at 324; see also Smith's Br. at 7. 
 
That disclosure prompted Smith's counsel to file a motion 
in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court requesting that Smith's 
sentences be vacated based upon prosecutorial misconduct. 
Smith also argued that the constitutional guarantee against 
double jeopardy prevented his retrial. When the motion was 
filed, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had not yet decided 
the merits of Smith's automatic direct appeal. Inasmuch as 
the record did not contain the circumstances surrounding 
the concealment of the lifters or the Commonwealth's 
alleged deal with Martray, the Supreme Court remanded 
the matter to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing on 
both issues. On remand, the trial court denied Smith any 
relief though it concluded that the prosecution had been 
guilty of serious misconduct. The trial court then forwarded 
its findings and conclusions of law to the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court. 591 A.2d at 731. 
 
On December 22, 1989, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
reversed Smith's convictions and granted him a new trial 
on grounds unrelated to the lifters or Martray's testimony. 
Commonwealth v. Smith, 568 A.2d 600 (Pa. 1989). It found 
that the evidence was sufficient to sustain Smith's 
convictions, Id. at 605, but held that allowing the 
aforementioned prejudicial hearsay statements into 
evidence constituted reversible error. Id. at 605-609. 
Inasmuch as that error warranted a new trial, the Court did 
not consider whether the Commonwealth's suppression of 
the lifters would also require a new trial. Instead, it noted 
that "[t]his evidence will now be available at a subsequent 
trial, and the jury will be given the opportunity to assess its 
import within the totality of the evidence presented." Id. at 
610 n.8. 
 
However, Smith was never retried. On remand, Smith 
once again filed a motion arguing that the guarantee 
 
                                12 
  
against double jeopardy prohibited retrial. The trial court 
denied that motion, and the Superior Court affirmed. 
Commonwealth v. Smith, 519 A.2d 730 (Pa. Super. 1991). 
However, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed despite 
its earlier statement that the lifters would be available at 
any subsequent trial. The Court held that prosecutorial 
misconduct barred Smith's retrial under the double 
jeopardy clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution, and the 
Court ordered Smith's discharge. Commonwealth v. Smith, 
615 A.2d 321 (Pa. 1992). In doing so the Court stated: 
 
       It is a gross understatement to conclude, as stated by 
       the trial court and Superior Court that "neither the 
       Attorney General's Office nor the Pennsylvania State 
       Police can take any great pride in the manner in which 
       this case was handled during the trial and on appeal." 
       Deliberate failure to disclose material exculpatory 
       physical evidence during a capital trial, intentional 
       suppression of the evidence while arguing in favor of 
       the death sentence on direct appeal, and the 
       investigation of Corporal Balshy's role in the 
       production of the evidence rather than its own role in 
       the suppression of evidence constitute prosecutorial 
       misconduct such as violates all principles of justice 
       and fairness embodied in the Pennsylvania 
       Constitution's double jeopardy clause. 
 
Id. at 324 (citation omitted). 
 
Smith was released from prison on September 18, 1992. 
 
II. DISTRICT COURT PROCEEDINGS 
 
On September 15, 1993, Smith filed the instantS 1983 
claim against State Troopers John Holtz, Ronald Coyler and 
Victor Dove; and Paul Yatron, John Purcell and William 
Lander of the Office of the Pennsylvania Attorney General.9 
He alleged that the defendants had deprived him of rights 
guaranteed under the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendments of the United States Constitution by 
deliberately concealing the lifters during his criminal trial, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. Lander was the Assistant Director of the Bureau of Criminal 
Investigation of the Attorney General's Office. 
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and his direct appeal.10 After extensive pretrial motions not 
relevant to this appeal, the suit proceeded to trial. At trial, 
over Smith's objection, the District Court allowed the jury 
to determine whether the lifters were material and 
exculpatory evidence under Brady v. Maryland.  The issue 
was submitted to the jury in the form of a special 
interrogatory. The claims against the remaining defendants, 
(Holtz, Dove and Yatron), were also submitted to the jury in 
the form of special interrogatories. 
 
The jury found that the lifters were not material and 
exculpatory evidence, and returned answers to all special 
interrogatories in favor of the defendants. Thereafter, the 
District Court directed the entry of judgment in favor of the 
defendants. Post-trial motions were denied, Smith v. Holtz, 
30 F. Supp.2d 468 (M. D. Pa. 1998), and this appeal 
followed. 
 
III. DISCUSSION 
 
Smith first argues that the District Court erred in failing 
to rule as a matter of law that the lifters were material and 
exculpatory under Brady. Second, he argues that the 
District Court erred in not deferring to the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court's holding that the lifters were exculpatory 
under Brady. He also argues that the District Court erred 
in allowing the jury to determine whether the lifters were 
material and exculpatory evidence; though this is merely a 
restatement of his second argument. Third, he argues that 
even if that issue was properly submitted to the jury, the 
District Court erred in not informing the jury of the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court's rulings on the Brady issue. 
Finally, Smith argues that the District Court erred in 
refusing to grant his motion for a new trial. 
 
By itself, S 1983 does not create any substantive rights, 
but it does provide a remedy for violation of rights created 
by the Constitution. Baker v. McCollan, 443 U. S. 137, 144 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. The civil rights claims did not include any cause of action based 
upon the perjured testimony of Martray, and Smith voluntarily dismissed 
his claims against Lander and Coyler prior to trial. He voluntarily 
dismissed his claim against Purcell during the trial. 
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n.3 (1979). Thus, Smith can not prevail on his S 1983 claim 
unless he can establish the denial of a constitutional right. 
See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U. S. 527 (1981). The 
constitutional deprivations that he alleges rest squarely 
upon the disclosure requirements of Brady. If suppression 
of the lifters does not amount to a constitutional violation 
under Brady, Smith can not establish a cause of action 
under S 1983. Accordingly, we begin our analysis with a 
review of Brady v. Maryland and its progeny. 
 
In Brady v. Maryland, the Supreme Court held that "the 
suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an 
accused upon request violates due process where the 
evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, 
irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the 
prosecution." 373 U.S. at 87. The Court subsequently held 
that the prosecution's duty to disclose favorable evidence is 
not dependent upon a request from the accused. United 
States v. Agurs, 427 U. S. 97, 107 (1976).11 Evidence is 
favorable to the accused under Brady "if it would tend to 
exculpate him or reduce the penalty. . . ." Id. at 87-88. The 
duty of disclosure is not limited to evidence the prosecutor 
is aware of. Rather, it includes "evidence known only to 
police investigators and not to the prosecutor." Kyles v. 
Whitley, 514 U. S. 419, 438 (1995). Thus, under Brady, 
"the individual prosecutor has a duty to learn of any 
favorable evidence known to the others acting on the 
government's behalf in the case, including the police." Id. at 
437. 
 
Even though this duty of disclosure is tightly tethered to 
constitutional guarantees of due process, "the Constitution 
is not violated every time the government fails or chooses 
not to disclose evidence that might prove helpful to the 
defense." Id. at 436-37 (citation omitted). Rather, the 
prosecution's failure to disclose evidence rises to the level of 
a due process violation "only if the government's evidentiary 
suppression undermines confidence in the outcome of the 
trial." Id. at 434. Thus, "[t]he question is not whether the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. The affirmative duty to disclose reaches impeachment evidence as 
well as exculpatory evidence. United States v. Bagley, 473 U. S. 667, 676 
(1985). 
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defendant would more likely than not have received a 
different verdict with the [concealed] evidence, but whether 
in its absence he received a fair trial, understood as a trial 
resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence." Id. 
 
Here, the jury determined that the lifters were not subject 
to disclosure under Brady, and the District Court agreed. 
The court stated, "Smith's argument is obviated by our 
conclusion that the jury properly found that the lifters were 
not Brady material." 30 F. Supp. 2d at 479-80. The court 
concluded that the lifters were not subject to Brady 
disclosure because they were not material, and the court 
reasoned that they weren't material because concealment of 
them did not diminish confidence in Smith's murder 
convictions. The District Court stated, "[e]vidence is 
material if its suppression undermines confidence in the 
outcome of the trial." 30 F.Supp. 2d at 473 (citing Bagley, 
473 U.S. 667, 678 (1985)). However, the District Court's 
analysis improperly conflates two separate and independent 
components of Brady into a single inquiry. The question of 
whether the prosecution must disclose evidence, i.e. 
whether the evidence is Brady material, must be 
determined independently of an inquiry into whether 
suppression of that evidence undermines confidence in the 
outcome of a criminal trial, i.e., whether the evidentiary 
suppression constitutes a Brady violation. 
 
Following oral argument before us in this case, the 
Supreme Court clarified this distinction between Brady 
material, and a Brady violation. In Strickler v. Greene, ___ 
U. S. ___, 119 S. Ct. 1936 (1999), the Court wrote: 
 
       [T]he term "Brady violation" is sometimes used to refer 
       to any breach of the broad obligation to disclose 
       exculpatory evidence -- that is, to any suppression of 
       so-called "Brady material" -- although, strictly 
       speaking, there is never a real "Brady violation" unless 
       the nondisclosure was so serious that there is a 
       reasonable probability that the suppressed evidence 
       would have produced a different verdict. There are 
       three components of a true Brady violation: The 
       evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, 
       either because it is exculpatory, or because it is 
       impeaching; that evidence must have been suppressed 
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       by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and 
       prejudice must have ensued. 
 
Id. at 1948.12 
 
Evidence of sand on Ms. Reinert's feet is certainly 
consistent with Smith's claim that she was killed at the 
seashore -- where Bradfield was on the weekend of her 
death. As noted above, the prosecutor clearly thought such 
evidence exculpatory, and stated as much in the 
memorandum he wrote mid-trial. The prosecutor believed 
that when viewed in context with Smith's trial tactics, "[i]t 
is obvious . . . that . . . [t]he sand . . . is extremely material 
to the defense case." 615 A.2d at 323. The Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court also concluded that the lifters were 
favorable to the defense. See Id. at 324 (Condeming the 
prosecution's "[d]eliberate failure to disclose material 
exculpatory physical evidence during a capital trial."). 
 
We agree that the lifters were Brady material, and we 
therefore disagree with the District Court's ruling to the 
contrary. See 30 F. Supp.2d at 479 (Agreeing with jury's 
determination that the lifters did not constitute Brady 
material). However, we nevertheless conclude that the 
District Court's ultimate holding that Smith failed to 
establish a Brady violation was correct. 13 
 
Smith repeatedly claims that the lifters were material 
and, therefore, that their concealment violated his due 
process right to a fair trial.14 However, Smith's argument 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. The District Court here obviously did not have the benefit of the 
holding in Strickler during the course of this trial. 
13. Inasmuch as we hold that Smith failed to establish a due process 
violation, we need not now determine if the District Court erred in 
allowing the jury to determine if the lifters were"material and 
exculpatory." 
 
14. Although the affirmative duty to disclose is placed upon the 
prosecutor, we will nonetheless assume for the purposes of this appeal 
that investigating police officers also have an affirmative duty to 
disclose 
exculpatory evidence to an accused if only by informing the prosecutor 
that the evidence exists. But see Kelly v. Curtis, 21 F.3d 1544, 1552 
(11th Cir. 1994). We will further assume that aS 1983 claim alleging a 
due process violation under Brady can, therefore, be asserted against 
police officers. See McMillian v. Johnson, 88 F.3d 1554, 1567 n.12 (11th 
Cir. 1996), amended, 101 F.3d 1363 (11th Cir. 1996). 
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confuses "Brady material" with the Brady materiality 
standard required to establish a due process violation. 
Evidence "is material only if there is a reasonable 
probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the 
defense, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different. A `reasonable probability' is a probability 
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." United 
States v. Bagley, 473 U. S. at 678. 
 
The lifters containing two grains of quartz crystals that 
could have been beach sand were favorable to Smith. They 
were exculpatory to the extent that they corroborated his 
contention that Bradfield killed Reinert at the Cape May 
shore. Thus, the Commonwealth had an affirmative duty to 
disclose them to Smith, and the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court so held. We share that Court's condemnation of the 
prosecutorial misconduct that occurred here. The 
reprehensible and unethical conduct of some of those 
involved in that prosecution is not, however, relevant to our 
inquiry in determining if Smith has made out his cause of 
action under S 1983. Despite the prosecutorial misconduct, 
Smith must establish the prejudice required for the due 
process violation that is the sine qua non of his claim for 
relief. He has not done so. 
 
Balshy testified at the civil trial as he had at Smith's 
criminal trial. He told the jury about noticing the sparkle 
on Reinert's feet and using the lifters to collect them. 
Although he testified at Smith's criminal trial that the 
material could have been sand, he testified at the trial in 
the instant suit that he was not qualified to make a 
scientific determination as to the exact nature of the 
material. Other witnesses testified that the material was 
quartz and that it was "ubiquitous" on the earth's surface. 
 
The District Court described the testimony as follows: 
 
       The quartz was examined by two forensic geologists. 
       One was Christopher Fiedler of the FBI laboratory in 
       Washington, D.C. He concluded that the quartz was 
       "common sand," probably originating from opal or 
       amethyst. Mr. Fiedler testified that quartz is found over 
       most of the earth's dry surface, perhaps as much as 
       65% of the earth's crust. He termed the material he 
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       found "ubiquitous," and opined that he wouldfind at 
       least two crystals on the body or in the clothing of any 
       person in the courtroom at the time he testified. 
 
30 F. Supp. 2d at 478. In a supplemental footnote, the 
court noted: "a search of internet sources" discovered one 
reference that concluded: " `Quartz is the most abundant 
mineral in the Earth's crust. Quartz has been found in 
meteorites and in some rocks collected on the moon.' " Id. 
at n.7.15 The court then summarized its assessment of the 
impact that withholding such evidence had on the integrity 
of Smith's murder convictions as follows: "It appears then 
that having these crystals on one's feet is as indicative of a 
trip to the moon as a trip to the beach." Id . Although the 
court was clearly engaging in hyperbole, we nevertheless 
share its conclusion that the post-conviction disclosure of 
the lifters, and the particles on them, falls woefully short of 
undermining confidence in Smith's murder convictions. 
 
Smith introduced the report of an expert he had retained 
for the hearings ordered by the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court. That expert opined that the quartz found on 
Reinert's feet was consistent with beach sand. However, 
that testimony is not inconsistent with Fielder's testimony. 
The quartz crystals could well have been beach sand. 
However, even if we completely credit Smith's expert's 
testimony, and completely ignore Fielder's statement that 
the two quartz crystals are "ubiquitous," and would have 
been found on anyone in the courtroom, all that is 
established is that two grains of sand that were found on 
Reinert's feet were consistent with beach sand. 16 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
15. The court's quotation was taken from a site entitled, "DesertUSA 
Magazine." See http://www.desertusa.com/mag98/mar/index.html. The 
reference is consistent with information contained in the online version 
of the Encyclopedia Britannica. See http://www.britannica.com/ 
bcom/eb/article/7/0,5716,63757+1,00.html. 
16. It could be argued that the fact that only two grains of sand were 
found on Ms. Reinert's foot strongly suggests that she was not killed at 
the beach as one would expect to find far more than two grains of sand 
on a victim's foot if she were killed on a beach. Thus, the quartz 
crystals 
are not unlike the proverbial "two edged sword" that cuts both for and 
against one's position. 
 
Nevertheless, we can not allow disclosure decisions under Brady to 
turn upon whether the prosecution thinks evidence is consistent only 
with innocence. Here, the evidence did support the defense theory, and 
should have been disclosed. 
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As noted above, at Smith's criminal trial the 
Commonwealth introduced physical evidence that 
 
inexorably tied Smith to Reinert's murder and the 
disappearance of her two children. Given the inquiry we 
must make under Brady, that evidence is worth repeating. 
The prosecution introduced the green pin with the white "P" 
that Beth Ann Brook saw Karen Reinert wearing when 
Karen was last seen, which the jury clearly believed was 
Karen's, and which was recovered under the front seat of 
Smith's car. A hair similar to Susan Reinert's was found 
inside Smith's home. Carpet fibers found on Reinert's body 
were similar to fibers from a carpet in the basement of 
Smith's home. A comb found under Reinert's body in her 
car contained the name of Smith's military unit, and was 
identical to combs found in Smith's home. Finally, Smith 
wrote a letter to his wife asking her to dispose of the 
incriminating carpet, and clean the interior of his car where 
Karen Reinert's pin was subsequently found. 
 
Even if we ignore the hearsay statements that were 
improperly admitted against Smith, and even if we also 
ignore Martray's suspect testimony, our confidence in 
Smith's convictions is not diminished in the least. We 
remain firmly convinced of the integrity of those guilty 
verdicts. Accordingly, there was no due process violation for 
purposes of Smith's S 1983 claim. A Brady  violation is 
established "by showing that the favorable evidence could 
reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a 
different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict." 
Kyles, at 435. The two grains of quartz can not possibly 
offset the evidence of Smith's guilt that was presented to 
the jury that convicted him of murdering Susan Reinert 
and her two children. Smith has not come close to 
demonstrating "a reasonable probability that the[criminal] 
jury would have returned a different verdict if the 
information had been disclosed. . . ." Buehl v. Vaughn, 166 
F.3d 163, 181 (3d Cir. 1999). Accordingly, he has not 
established that withholding Brady material resulted in a 
Brady violation, and we can therefore dispose of Smith's 
remaining issues with only brief discussion. 
 
In light of our discussion, Smith's claim that the District 
Court erred by not finding as a matter of law that the lifters 
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were material and exculpatory is meritless. His assertion 
that the District Court erred in submitting that issue to the 
jury is therefore also meritless.17 In fact, that argument 
elevates form over substance because the District Court 
expressly found that "had the question been left to the 
court, we would have agreed with the jury's conclusion." 30 
F. Supp.2d at 479. Therefore the District Court clearly 
stated that it would have decided that the lifters were 
immaterial as a matter of law. We disagree with that 
conclusion insofar as the court believed the lifters were not 
what is generically referred to as Brady material. However, 
we conclude the lifters were immaterial in that they would 
not have changed the outcome of Smith's criminal trial and 
their suppression was not, therefore, a Brady  violation. 
 
Smith's argument that the District Court erred in not 
deferring to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision on 
the Brady issue or, in the alternative, that it should have 
allowed the jury to learn of that decision is also meritless. 
Smith claims that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was 
"the only court which conducted a full review of the 
evidence presented at plaintiff 's criminal trial, and reviewed 
the entire evidentiary record regarding the lifters,[and] 
concluded that they were Brady evidence." Smith's Br. at 
18. His argument refers to the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court's holding that prosecutorial misconduct barred 
Smith's retrial. See 615 A.2d 321 (Pa. 1992). 
 
Smith misstates the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's 
decision. That court never performed an analysis to 
determine if the Commonwealth's unethical conduct 
constituted a Brady violation. Rather, the Court focused 
upon whether the Commonwealth's conduct during Smith's 
murder trial (including the prosecutor's failure to disclose 
Martray's pending criminal charges), the continued 
suppression of favorable evidence while arguing in favor of 
Smith's execution during the appellate process, and the 
Commonwealth's excoriation and investigation of Corporal 
Balshy, constituted the kind of egregious prosecutorial 
overreaching that precluded Smith's retrial under the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
17. As noted above, this is merely a restatement of the preceding 
argument. 
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double jeopardy clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution. 
The Court answered that inquiry in the affirmative, but it 
never inquired into whether the Commonwealth's conduct 
undermined confidence in the murder convictions, and it 
never held that the Commonwealth's conduct amounted to 
a Brady violation. 
 
Smith also argues that the doctrine of offensive collateral 
estoppel barred relitigation of the materiality of the lifters 
because their materiality and exculpatory nature had 
already been established by the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court. However, Smith could not prevail on this argument 
even if the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had decided that 
issue as Smith says. As we have stated, the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court did not address the due process component 
of a Brady violation. Therefore, the doctrine does not apply.18 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
18. Here, several factors preclude the application of offensive collateral 
estoppel. Neither Holtz, nor Dove, nor Yatron made the decision not to 
disclose the existence of the lifters. Although Dove waited one week 
before he told anyone about the lifters, he did eventually turn them over 
to Holtz who immediately informed Guida. It was Guida, the prosecutor, 
who made the decision not to disclose the lifters to Smith's counsel. At 
the time he made that decision Guida represented the Commonwealth's 
interests, not the interests of Holtz, Dove or Yatron. However, Guida, as 
prosecutor, has absolute immunity from liability in Smith's S 1983 action 
so long as he was functioning in his prosecutorial capacity when he 
made that decision. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U. S. 409 (1976); see also 
Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U. S. 259 (1993) ( prosecutor has absolute 
immunity in S 1983 action for the initiation and pursuit of a criminal 
prosecution, including presentation of the state's case at trial). Since 
Guida has absolute immunity, the State Troopers and Attorney General 
personnel are the only Commonwealth actors Smith can sue under 
S 1983. See Smiddy v. Varney, 665 F.2d 261, 266-67 (9th Cir. 1981). 
 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court did not blame any one individual for 
the unethical misconduct that it found. Instead, it cast blame upon "the 
Commonwealth" in general, and "the prosecutor" in particular. Smith's 
civil action is against the defendants in their individual capacities, but 
they are not in privity with the government in a prior criminal 
prosecution when sued in their individual capacities. See Morgan v. 
Gertz, 166 F.3d 1307, 1309 (10th Cir. 1999); see also 18 CHARLES A. 
WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
               
PROCEDURE S 4458, at 508 (1981) ("[A] judgment against a government 
does not bind its officials in subsequent litigation that asserts a 
personal 
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Finally, Smith makes three arguments in support of his 
contention that the District Court erred in denying his 
motion for a new trial. Smith argues that he is entitled to 
a new trial because the jury's findings in favor of Dove and 
Yatron are against the weight of the evidence. As a general 
rule, "[w]e review the district court's order ruling on a 
motion for a new trial for abuse of discretion unless the 
court's denial is based on the application of a legal precept, 
in which case the standard of review is plenary." Rotondo v. 
Keene Corp., 956 F.2d 436, 438 (3d Cir. 1992)."[T]he 
district court ought to grant a new trial on the basis that 
the verdict was against the weight of the evidence only 
where a miscarriage of justice would result if the verdict 
were to stand." Klein v. Hollings, 992 F.2d 1285, 1290 (3d 
Cir. 1993). For the reasons we have previously discussed, 
the jury's findings here clearly do not result in a 
miscarriage of justice, and Smith's argument to the 
contrary is frivolous. 
 
Absent a showing that the suppression of the lifters 
constituted a Brady violation, Dove and Yatron are not 
liable to Smith under S 1983. Equally without merit is 
Smith's argument that the District Court erred by 
permitting the defendants here to introduce certain 
inculpatory evidence that supported the Commonwealth's 
criminal case against him. Smith argues that the only 
relevant inquiry at his S 1983 trial was whether the 
defendants intentionally suppressed evidence. However, as 
we have already explained, this misstates the relevant 
inquiry. 
 
       Essentially, . . ., the question we must resolve is: when 
       viewed as a whole and in light of the substance of the 
       prosecution's case, did the government's failure to 
       provide . . . Brady . . . evidence to the defense . . . lead 
       to an untrustworthy guilty verdict . . .? 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
liability against the officials."). Therefore, the District Court did not 
abuse its discretion in refusing to apply the doctrine of offensive 
collateral estoppel. Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 
331 
(1979). (The application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel is within 
the 
"broad discretion" of the trial court.) 
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U.S. v. Pelullo, 105 F.3d 117, 123 (3d Cir. 1997)(emphasis 
added). Here, the answer is a resounding "no." There is 
nothing untrustworthy about Smith's conviction for 
murder. Therefore, even if the District Court erred in 
allowing additional evidence of guilt to be introduced during 
Smith's civil trial, the error was harmless. 
 
Finally, Smith argues that the District Court erred in not 
granting his motion to bifurcate his trial into liability and 
damages phases. Smith apparently actually asked the court 
to "trifurcate" the trial into three phases to separately 
determine the "due process violation, injury, and damages." 
30 F. Supp. 2d at 480. We review the court's refusal to 
"bifurcate" the trial for an abuse of discretion. Barr 
Laboratories, Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories, 978 F.2d 98, 105 
(3d Cir. 1992). Smith has not established the court's 
determination of the best way to proceed was an abuse of 
discretion. Moreover, inasmuch as he did not establish a 
Brady violation, we fail to see how he was prejudiced by the 
court's decision to deny Smith's request to divide the trial 
into three separate phases. 
 
IV. 
 
Accordingly, we will affirm the order of the District Court. 
Our confidence in Smith's convictions for the murder of 
Susan Reinert and her two children is not the least bit 
diminished by consideration of the suppressed lifters and 
quartz particles, and Smith has therefore not established 
that he is entitled to compensation for the unethical 
conduct of some of those involved in the prosecution. 
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